Showing posts with label internet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label internet. Show all posts

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Browser behavior

We've already got controls in the browser to do things like reject attempts to set third-party (not belonging to the domain of the Web site you're visiting) cookies. I think we need to extend this idea further to make more behaviors dependent on the first-party vs. third-party distinction:

  • Allow sending of cookies to the site you're visiting while not sending cookies in requests for third-party content. Eg. Facebook's cookies get sent when you're visiting Facebook itself, but if you're visiting CNN's Web site then when fetching the Facebook Like button on thier page Facebook cookies are not sent.
  • Allow Javascript to run when it's fetched from the same domain as the site you're visiting, but not allow it to run when it's being fetched from a different domain.
  • Allow image blocking to block only third-party images.
  • In all cases where there's a block-list in the browser, allow for three settings: allow always, allow first-person only (block third-person), and block always.

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

IPv4 address pool draining fast

We're down to just seven /8 netblocks left. Those are the blocks assigned to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) who hand out blocks of addresses to entities needing to connect to the Internet. That means we've got effectively 2 blocks left, since when it hits 5 unallocated blocks each of the 5 RIRs will automatically get one of those 5. That'll exhaust the pool of addresses ICANN can allocate to RIRs.

That won't mean too much immediately. The RIRs have unassigned space they can keep handing out. But they won't be able to go to ICANN to get more blocks. That means that when they assign their last space, that's it. Finished. No more. You want on the Internet? Sorry, no addresses left the RIR can give you. It won't be a big cliff, but gradually there'll be more and more problems. Hosting centers won't be able to add more machines because they don't have addresses to give them and can't get any. Consumer ISPs will have problems signing up subscribers because all the addresses available in that area are in use and the ISP can't get more address space. I figure it'll take about 6 months to a year to really come to a head.

Me, I'm going to finish prepping my LAN and gateway for full IPv6 capability and setting things up to run IPv6 internally in parallel with IPv4. That way I'll be ready for the inevitable switch to IPv6 by Cox. And I'm going to make sure any routers I buy will handle IPv6.

And I really ought to work out how to load custom firmware into Netgear routers and access points. I've things I want to do with them.

Thursday, October 7, 2010

URL shortener problem

If you use Twitter, you're probably familiar with the bit.ly URL shortener service. Even if you don't, you're probably familiar with TinyURL, bit.ly, vb.ly or other URL shortener services. They seem convenient. No more having to type or remember long URLs, just create a short one. No problem.

Until vb.ly went off the air. The domain was siezed by the Libyan registrar that controls the .ly hierarchy, because content at the locations pointed to by vb.ly violated Libyan morality laws.

This is why URL shorteners are a bad idea. They create URLs that are under the control of a third party and which can be disrupted at any time. Since there's no direct mention of where the shortened URL points, once disruption happens it's impossible to locate the original destination. If you use the actual full URL, disruption can only occur if the actual site referred to is taken off-line.

Note also that this is why you should make your own copy of content if you really care about having it available. If you merely link to it, it's vulnerable to the destination taking it down or just changing what it says. Only when you control the copy can you insure that it doesn't change or become unavailable in the future. This may annoy copyright holders, however I feel that if I'm writing commentary on what someone said then making a copy to insure I can prove they did in fact say what I claim they said falls under fair use, and making a complete copy is neccesary to show that I'm not merely cherry-picking and taking bits out of context to misrepresent what was actually said and so also falls under fair use.

Saturday, July 17, 2010

DNS root zone is now signed

The DNS root zone is now signed via DNSSEC. The idea behind DNSSEC is that the owner of a zone (roughly a domain) generates a public key and their DNS servers will digitally sign the records they serve up. Intermediate DNS servers will preserve those signatures, allowing querying machines to determine whether the records have been altered from what the authoritative nameserver sent. This makes it a lot harder to do a man-in-the-middle attack against DNS, hijacking a caching nameserver (say one belonging to an ISP) in order to re-route traffic to an attacker's servers. Not impossible, but it's a lot more involved. That's because the public key needed to verify a signature is returned from the zone above the signed zone and is signed by that zone, eg. the public key for silverglass.org's records is returned from the .org zone's server and the key for the .org zone is returned by the root nameservers. So for an attacker to forge silverglass.org records, he has to subvert the entire chain back to the root. Each verifying machine has the single key for the root zone pre-loaded (and presumably verified out-of-band to make sure it's valid), so it's infeasible to fake signatures on records for the TLDs (eg. .com, .org, .us). If I can control the records returned for .org queries I can substitute my key for silverglass.org's, allowing me to forge signatures on silverglass.org records. But since I can't substitute my key for the root key I can't fake signatures of the .org records containing the silverglass.org key, and any verifying server will detect my forgery.

That's great for security, but it poses a problem for some (IMO unethical) ISPs and DNS providers like Network Solutions. That's because they've been playing a game: when someone asks for a domain that doesn't exist, instead of returning NXDOMAIN (non-existent domain) for the query they've returned a valid result for the name pointing at their servers which serve up advertising, search results and the like. Essentially they take ownership of every single invalid domain and slap their advertisements on it. But as soon as downstream DNS servers (eg. the ones in every home router) start verifying DNSSEC signatures, the gravy train ends because those ISPs and DNS providers have no way of forging valid signatures. The only exception is that the registry operator can forge results for completely unowned domains within it's scope, and the most common DNS software around has a flag to stop that (TLD servers are expected to only delegate to 2LD servers, they should never return actual results so any results they try to return must be faked and should be treated as NXDOMAIN).

Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Title I, Title II

Well, the broadband Internet providers may have gotten their wish, and it'll be ashes in their mouths. A while back, Comcast won a legal victory when they got a ruling saying that the FCC didn't have any authority under Title I to regulate them (and specifically their throttling and shaping of bandwidth based on content and the destination the user was trying to get to).

Well, that's all well and good, except that there's this other part of the relevant law known as Title II. Title I applies to information services. Title II applies to telecommunications services. And the FCC has specific legal authority to decide which one Internet service providers fall under. So the FCC's going to simply shrug it's shoulders and reclassify Internet service as a telecommunications service (as it was back before the Bush era's reclassification of it) falling under Title II. That gives them plenty of authority to impose all sorts of regulations the ISPs don't like, although the FCC's proposing putting in place some binding rules limiting the amount of regulation actually imposed.

Advice: don't taunt the bull if you don't want to get the horns.

.xxx domain argued for

ICM Registry, which has submitted the .xxx TLD for approval, is pushing for it's approval and adoption. The argument is that parents can then filter out that domain to block inappropriate content.

Yes, well, I suppose that'll work just as well as RFC 3514 - The Security Flag in the IPv4 Header, better known as the Evil Bit.

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

The Internet turns 40

The Internet as we know it is 40 years old today. The very first RFC, RFC 1 - Host Software, was published on April 7, 1969.